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Over the decades, the advance of the social networking sites and computer-mediated 
communication tools has facilitated cybercriminals to expand their scope of criminal 
activities from the physical world to the virtual realm. Cybercriminals can easily leverage 
the Internet to operate sexual crime such as cyber-harassment. This study aims to 
empirically assess cyber-harassment victimization in South Korea via Cyber-Routine 
Activities Theory (2008). Cyber-Routine Activities Theory includes five major tenets: 1) 
digital capable guardianship, 2) motivated offender online, 3) suitable target online, 4) 
online risky behavior, and 5) online vocational and leisure activities. Data were derived 
from the 2013 Korean Institute of Criminology’s survey, which is dedicated to examining 
Koreans’ social networking sites usages and its related online behaviors. The results 
suggest that risky online behaviors and inadequate cyber security on social networking 
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 After the advent of the information era, a number of cybercrimes have been 
committed by cybercriminals in South Korea. In the beginning of the information era 
virus attacks were dominant in the scene of crime in cyberspace. Thompson (2004) stated 
that the main types of cybercrime or computer crime were the basic level of computer 
virus attacks instead of online interpersonal crime (cyber-harassment, cyber-stalking, and 
online sexual crime) until the 1990s. Cybercrime became more complicated with the 
highly advanced intimating skills such as the stuxnet virus, distributed denial of service 
(DDOS) attack, ransomware, scams, identify theft, Internet fraud, and online 
interpersonal crime (Internet Crime Report, 2014). Choi (2015) describes that the 
development of IT technologies facilitate cybercriminals to obtain more efficient toolkits 
such as high-speed Internet connection speed, decrypted software, and malware 
programs.  
 In addition, due to the advanced technologies - Internet services, computer 
systems, social networking services, and smart phones - online users are actively 
engaging in utilizing social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, KakaoStory, and 
Instagram. Social networking sites (SNSs) connect us with friends and family, sharing 
our personal interests and experiences (George, 2014). However, cybersecurity 
professionals argue that the next wave of cybercrime will be committed through social 
media channels (George, 2014). The number of online interpersonal crime, especially 
cyber-harassment, has been consistently increased in cyberspace. It is considered a side 
effect of cutting-edge technology that threats South Korean citizens. According to the 
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Korean National Policy Agency (KNP, May 2015), 7,873 perpetrators were arrested for 
cyber-harassment in 2013. Cyber-harassment causes victims to experience physical or 
emotional stress, a sense of helplessness, fear for victims, and even suicide (Bocij, 2004; 
Finn, 2004; Wall, 2001; National Center for victims of crime, 2007; Bossler & Holt, 
2010).  
 Cyber-harassment not only affects Korean society, but it is also a controversial 
issue for the world. Due to the features of cyberspace – no limitation of temporality and 
spatiality – cyber harassment and online prostitution are proliferating across the world. 
Hence, the international and national levels of law enforcement are demanded to prevent 
cyber harassment. It seems that law enforcement struggles to deter cyber harassment 
(Hazelwood & Koon-Magnin, 2013). In addition, most online users may not be fully 
aware of cyber harassment.  
 While cyber harassment became a controversial and transnational issue in South 
Korea, few studies have been conducted to investigate cyber harassment. Thus, this study 
aims to empirically assess cyber-harassment victimization in South Korea through the 
application of Cyber-Routine Activities Theory.  
 The following sections will present an overview of SNSs and a cyber harassment 





Background of Cyber-harassment on SNSs 
Social Networking Sites 
 Social Networking Sites launched to be operated for certain purposes such as 
communication and interaction among online users in the mid-1990s (Yoon & Park, 
2014). Boyd and Ellison (2008) found that the first SNS (SixDegrees.com) was launched 
in 1997 and the main function was to enforce one’s social connections between seller and 
buyer for business markets. Furthermore, SNSs became popular with diverse activities 
and entertainment in the 2000s (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). In recent years, millions of users 
have used SNSs such as KaKaoStory, Facebook, and Twitter in South Korea (Boyd & 
Ellison, 2008).  
 SNSs are defined as web-based services that provide opportunities to reinforce 
pre-existing social networks and help strangers connect to each other by allowing them to 
share interests, political views, and activities (Boyd & Ellison, 2008; McCuddy & Vogel, 
2014; Yoon & Park, 2014). After joining social networking sites, an individual is able to 
set his or her personal information, which typically include age, location, interests, cell 
phone number, e-mail address, etc. (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). SNSs can connect with 
communication tools such as smartphone connectivity, blogging, and photo/video-sharing 
(Boyd & Ellison, 2008). They provide a mechanism for online users to leave messages to 
their friends’ SNSs as well as using private messenger functions similar to webmail 
(Boyd & Ellison, 2008).      
 According to Statista (2015), the statistics indicate that there are 1.79 billion 
social network users around world as of 2014. Also, the statistics show that 27.9 million 
social network users in South Korea and 173.6 million social network users in the United 
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States registered as active users in 2014 (Statista, March 2015). Based on the 2015 
statistics data from Statista, the majority of social network users in South Korea were 
interested in using Facebook, Twitter, KaKaostory, and Cyworld; the social networking 
users in the United States mainly favored the use of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 
Pinterest in 2014 (Statista, 2015 March). Two major SNSs (e.g., KaKaoStory and 
Facebook) in South Korea will be introduced in this paper in order to understand the 
Koreans’ SNS usages.  
 KakaoStory was invented in 2012 as a mobile-based web service, which has 
features such as uploading multimedia contents, built-in blogging, and instant messaging 
technology (Yoon & Park, 2014). The number of KaKaoStory users dramatically 
increased and there were approximately 44 million users in 2014; moreover, it is 
currently one of the most popular SNSs in South Korea (Yoon & Park, 2014). Generally, 
KaKaoStory is a mobile-specific SNS, which allows users to actively interact with each 
other within the SNS applications; however, the mobile interaction can be confined with 
KaKaoStory’s security settings. In other words, the limited mobile interactions with the 
security settings may reduce the victimization rates of cybercrime (Jagatic et al., 2007).      
 Facebook was launched in 2004 as both a web-based service and mobile-based 
web service. Facebook allows users to do the following: share personal profiles, leave 
messages, blog, and share photo/videos (Kim et al., 2014). Online users can decide their 
Facebook’s cyber security level, which prohibits accessing from unknown online users. 
Facebook is the most popular SNS around the globe; however, it is ranked second 
following KaKaoStory in South Korea. The number of Facebook users was estimated to 
be approximately 10 million in 2014.  
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 In a few ways, significant differences exist between online social networks and 
conventional social networks (Acar, 2008; McCuddy & Vogel, 2014). First, the size of 
online social networks is typically greater than traditional social networks (McCuddy & 
Vogel, 2014). McCuddy and Vogel (2014) suggest that whereas the quality of 
relationships in both the physical and the cyber world is similar, online users can actively 
connect with important friends via SNSs rather than physical world peer group 
connection. According to Pempek’s et al. (2009) research, the majority of online users 
spend more time observing other users’ content on SNSs rather than posting their own 
content on SNSs. Without doubt, social networking sites strengthen social networks 
through the interaction among individuals. On the other hand, social network users are 
more likely to be exposed to deviant acts online. For example, online users can be victims 
of cyber-harassment or stalking by cybercriminals at all times of the day regardless of the 
proximity and temporality (Holt & Bossler, 2014; Marcum, 2010; McCuddy & Vogel, 
2014).  
 Unfortunately, general SNS users have still not recognized the overall seriousness 
of cybercrime victimization, especially with cyber-harassment. It is very important to 
protect us from cyber-harassment, therefore, our society is demanded to shed light on the 
seriousness of cyber-harassment. Nonetheless, to date, little research has been conducted 
on this topic. As a result, new criminological terms and conceptual definitions with 
cyber-harassment will be discussed in the next section.  
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Cyber-harassment on Social Networking Sites 
 With the pervasive growth of Internet and computer communication systems, 
cyber-harassment has become a serious issue in South Korea (Hwang, October 2015). 
While law enforcement in South Korea has been attempting to implement procedures and 
policies to reduce online criminal activity, including cyber-harassment and cyber-stalking, 
it appears that there is still a lack of an agreed upon definition of both cyber-harassment 
and cyber-stalking.    
 In South Korea, there are two pieces of legislation that pertain to these types of 
illicit behaviors: Korean Telecommunication Act of 2011 and Korean National Sexual 
Offenses Law, both of which attempt to regulate cyber-harassment. Under the Korean 
Telecommunication Act of 2011, cyber-harassment is defined as an act or behavior that 
repeatedly terrorizes or threatens an individual via unwanted e-mails, instant messages, or 
other means with the intention of harming that person (Hazelwood & Koon-Magnin, 
2013). According to the Korean National Sexual Offenses Law, cyber-harassment is a 
behavior in which a perpetrator sends unwanted e-mails, instant messages, pictures, and 
video files via SNSs with the intent to cause sexual shame and aversion.  
 In general, cyber-harassment can be interpreted as a delinquent behavior that 
repeatedly sends unwanted contents such as e-mails, instant messages, and sexually 
shameful pictures or video files (Holt & Bossler, 2009). These unwanted files may 
negatively influence a victim’s life, especially their mental or emotional state (Kunz & 
Wilson, 2004). Kunz and Wilson (2004) explain that cyber-stalking is a common form of 
cyber-harassment. Thus, based on the two aforementioned Korean national laws, 
cyberstalking is regarded as a form of cyber-harassment. With that in mind, the 
 13 
measurement of cyber-harassment victimization in this paper will include cyber-stalking 
variables due to the empirical nexus between cyber-harassment and cyberstalking. Some 
suggest that cyber-bullying is quite similar to cyber-harassment. However, this paper is 
not concerned with measuring cyber-bullying variables since the majority of cyber-
bullying victimization tends to focus solely on children under age 18, rather than 
capturing the entire national population.  
 In order to have a better, more comprehensive understanding of cyber-harassment, 
the Yoo v. Cho case will now be represented as an explicit example of cyber-harassment 
that has recently occurred in South Korea. The purpose of sharing this case is to 
demonstrate how these crimes have proliferated, and the ultimate negative effect that they 
can have on victims. Yoo was the student of Cho in a high school in South Korea 
(KBSnews, September 2014; MKnews, January 2014). Yoo was in unrequited love with 
his teacher. Yoo had solicited his former teacher to date him, but Cho rejected him. After 
this rejection, Yoo dropped out of the school and spread a vicious rumor through email to 
high school staff that he was in a secret relationship with his former teacher, Cho 
(Lawtime, January 2014; MKnews, January 2014). He persistently stalked and harassed 
Cho offline and online. Yoo then attempted to rape his teacher but failed in February 
2011 (KBSnews, September 2014; Lawtime, January 2014). He was later diagnosed with 
a psychological delusional disorder and has since received specialized treatment in a 
hospital (KBSnews, September 2014; Lawtime, January 2014). 
 This story did not end with Yoo’s hospitalization. In fact, Yoo went on to study 
nursing in a U.S. college, but still remained fixated on his former teacher. After hearing a 
rumor that his former teacher was going to get married, Yoo began to become unraveled 
 14 
psychologically and began looking for his former teacher (KBSnews, September 2014, 
Lawtime, January 2014). Yoo specifically tried to contact Cho’s family and his friends, 
but had no luck. He eventually found Cho’s personal information using the Internet 
where he then proceeded to harass and threaten to kill Cho, specifically using her SNSs 
— sending approximately four hundred unwanted e-mails (KBSnews, September 2014; 
Lawtime, January 2014).  Yoo then took a leave of absence from nursing school in the 
U.S. and decided to visit Cho’s actual office in South Korea. At first, he asked Cho to 
date him but she vigorously refused. Finally, out of his inability to win Cho’s heart, Yoo 
murdered Cho in her office elevator (KBSnews, September 2014; Lawtime, January 
2014). 
 A Seoul city prosecutor in South Korea charged the offender with homicide and 
both offline and online stalking. In July 2014, Yoo was sentenced to a thirty-five-prison 
sentence (KBSnews, September 2014; Lawtime, January 2014). It is important to note, 
this particular criminal case is only one example of hundreds of cases that has transpired 
in South Korea, further warranting a deeper understanding of this type of criminal 
behavior.  
 The next chapter includes two phases. Phase 1 presents routine activities theory 
and lifestyle exposure theory. Phase 2 presents cyber-routine activities theory along with 
a review of the relevant empirical studies designed to assess the tenets that apply to the 






   Although cyber-criminologists have attempted to assess the empirical tests of 
cybercrime in many countries, there are few empirical assessments on cyber harassment 
in South Korea. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to empirically assess cyber 
harassment victimization via Choi’s Cyber-Routine Activities Theory (2008).  
 In this chapter, traditional routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), life-
exposure theory (Hindelang et al., 1978), and cyber-routine activities theory (Choi, 2008) 
will be discussed. As a next step, certain tenets of cyber-routine activities theory – 
capable guardianship, online risky behavior, and online vocational and leisure activities – 
will be interpreted into cyber-harassment.  
Routine Activities Theory 
 Cohen and Felson (1979) claimed that routine activities theory could explain why 
crimes occurred. Cohen and Felson’s traditional routine activities theory consists of three 
major tenets: (a) motivated offenders, (b) suitable targets, and (c) the absence of capable 
guardianship (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Cohen, Felson, & Land, 1980; Felson, 1986, 1988; 
Kennedy & Forde, 1990; Massey, Krohn, & Bonati, 1989; Miethe, Stafford, & Long, 
1987; Roneck & Maier, 1991; Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989). Cohen and Felson 
(1979) assumed that the likelihood of crime is increased when three tenets of routine 
activities theory are convergent in space and time (Akers & Sellers, 2013). Studies that 
examine routine activities theory often concentrate on general offending crime patterns 
reflecting the conjunction of these elements of crime (motivated offenders, suitable 
targets, and absence of guardians). Akers and Sellers (2013) stated that routine activities 
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theory is also employed to investigate specific types of offending, such as homicide, sex 
offending, robbery, burglary, and cybercrime victimization. 
 Hindelang et al. (1978) proposed the lifestyle exposure theory, which mainly 
focuses on the victims’ daily social interactions, rather than concentrating on the 
characteristics of individual offenders or individual causal variables. Hindelang et al. 
(1978) found that individuals’ vocational and leisure activities is directly associated with 
crime victimization. In short, Hindelang et al. (1978) asserted that differential lifestyle 
patterns are correlated with “role expectations, structural constraints, and individual and 
subcultural adaptations” (Choi, 2008; Hindelang et al., 1979, p. 245).   
Cyber-Routine Activities Theory 
 Choi (2008) mainly argued that Cohen and Felson (1979) incorporated the 
lifestyle-exposure theory (Hindelang et al., 1978) into their routine activities theory by 
expanding upon the existent tenet: individual’s vocational and leisure activities. In Cohen 
and Felson’s (1979) view, target suitability is created and influenced by an individual’s 
vocational and leisure activities, which reflect the individuals’ routine activities such as 
social interaction and social activities (Choi, 2008). Also Cohen and Felson (1979) 
developed two other tenets – capable guardianship and motivated offender – and 
integrated these two tenets with the suitable target tenet from lifestyle-exposure theory. 
The theoretical integration is essential to help explain the new crime phenomenon. Choi 
(2008) argues that routine activities theory and lifestyle-exposure theory are originally 
not two disconnected theories, but that routine activities theory is extended from the 
lifestyle-exposure theory.    
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 Choi (2008) developed cyber-routine activities theory in order to assess the 
computer-crime victimization reflecting both traditional routine activities theory and 
lifestyle exposure theory. Choi (2008) combines routine activities theory and lifestyle 
exposure theory. His conceptual model posits that digital-capable guardianship and 
online lifestyle directly influence computer-crime victimization.  
Digital Capable Guardianship   
 Choi (2008) stressed that digital capable guardianship is one of the most crucial 
elements to prevent computer crimes. Digital capable guardianship is defined as a 
protection tool that helps online users secure themselves from cyber criminals. Choi 
(2008) clarifies that there are two types of digital capable guardians: physical digital 
guardians and cyber security guardians. The physical digital guardians – antivirus 
software, firewalls, and antispyware – protect the computer systems and personal assets 
against computer criminals. The cyber security guardian – security on SNSs and security 
applications on SNSs – protect online users against interpersonal criminals online. In 
related sense, cybersecurity is an essential feature (Archer et al., 2014) on SNSs, which 
can be prevented from misuse of personal data such as cyber-harassment, sextortion 
scams, and online prostitution. Both physical digital guardianship and cyber security 
guardianship are associated with target hardening to enforce the level of inertia from 
criminals. In the real world, lighting on areas, using locks, alarms and barriers are 
regarded as means of target hardening (Choi, 2008; Tseloni et al., 2004).  
 Recently, Choi (2008) has empirically assessed computer crime victimization by 
measuring the physical digital guardians. As an extension of the perspective, this study 
tests cyber-harassment victimization by measuring the degree of cyber security 
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guardianship. Holt (2011) similarly claimed that physical digital guardians have rarely 
influenced the victimization of interpersonal violence such as cyber harassment. Holt’s 
statement was somewhat contradictory to the measure of digital capable guardians. The 
reason is that the digital capable guardian factor should not be limited with physical 
digital guardians – antivirus software, firewalls, and antispyware – which mainly 
influence computer crime victimization, not cyber-harassment victimization. In other 
words, cyber security guardians such as cyber security on SNSs and security application 
on SNSs must be measured for the accurate model of interpersonal cybercrime 
victimization, including cyber-harassment and cyberstalking.      
Formal and Informal Capable Guardianship 
  Yar (2005) asserts that formal/ informal capable guardians seem to not 
effectively minimize the occurrence of cybercrime victimization. In other words, formal/ 
informal agents have difficulty in dealing with cybercrime. Other studies (Holt, 2009; 
Reyns, 2011) indicate that formal/ informal capable guardianship factors did not 
influence the rate of online sexual crime victimization, including cyber stalking and cyber 
harassment.  
 In general, most online sexual crime victims tend not to report their criminal 
incidents to law enforcement and SNS providers. According to the Korean Institute of 
Criminology (KIC) survey (2013), SNS users in South Korea have the lowest level of 
reliability for formal/informal guardianship to solve the cyber-harassment issue(s). With 
respect to formal guardianship, 180 of 1000 SNS users in the survey indicated that they 
have never reported cyber-harassment issue(s) to the police; 135 of 180 SNS users in the 
survey did not report it to the police because they believed that their victimization was 
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not serious; 28 of 180 SNSs users in the survey did not report it to the police because they 
did not feel like taking the time to report it. Only 3 of 1,000 in the survey who reported 
cyber-harassment issues were satisfied with the service of the police, but the offender was 
not captured. With regard to informal guardianship, 173 of 1000 SNS users in the survey 
did not report to SNS providers after cyber-harassment victimization on SNSs; 105 of 
173 SNS users in the survey who did not report it to providers believed that their 
victimizations were not serious; 48 of 173 SNS users in the survey who did not report it 
to providers believed that they did not feel like taking the time to report it to providers. 
Only 12 of 1,000 SNS users reported the cyber-harassment issue(s) to providers; 8 of 12 
SNS users who reported it to providers were not satisfied with the service of the 
providers; 4 of 12 users who reported it to providers were satisfied with the providers’ 
solution for the cyber-harassment issue(s).    
 In short, there is no significant relationship between formal/informal guardianship 
and minimizing the occurrence of cyber-harassment victimization based on the previous 
studies by Yar (2005), Holt (2009), and Reyns (2011) and the descriptive analysis in this 
study. Therefore, this study will only focus on measuring digital guardianship in order to 




 According to cyber-routine activities theory (Choi, 2008), motivated offenders in 
the virtual world are a given situation. Individual cyber criminals are motivated by 
various factors (Grabosky, 2015). Moreover, Grabosky (2015) asserts that cyber 
criminals’ motivation may be complex, or mixed. Plenty of motivated cyber criminals 
seek to catch valuable targets in the form of online users who connect to the Internet 
website with a lack of computer security level (Grabosky, 2015). Normally, hackers are 
motivated by their satisfaction of how they can control cyberspace and computer 
networking system (Grabosky, 2015). Hackers plant malicious viruses and worms on 
social networking sites or web forum sites to receive individuals’ information when 
online users click a pop-up window without precaution (Choi, 2008; Piazza, 2006, p.54).  
 However, the characteristics of individuals engaged in the online interpersonal 
crimes (cyber-harassment and cyber-stalking) may be different from that of cybercrime 
perpetration in general (UNODC, 2013). Online interpersonal criminals search for 
attractive targets on SNSs or online dating sites. Cyber harassers and stalkers may seek to 
“exert power over their victims” via giving them fear (McGrath & Casey, 2002, p. 89). 
By increasing their knowledge of the victim, the perpetrator can terrorize and control 
them. Specifically, cyber harassers and stalkers utilize or post on SNS victims’ personal 
information: cellphone numbers, addresses, e-mail addresses, personal preferences, and 
photos, including nude photos in order to threaten their victims’ lives (McGrath & Casey, 
2002). As a result, sharing the information online may place the victim in danger (Maras, 




 Many suitable targets exist in the cyber world. Choi (2008) utilized Felson’s 
VIVA (1998) assessment to explain the nature of suitable targets online.  
 Value. Yar (2005) states that the targets’ value in cybercrime cannot be simply 
defined because the perpetrator’s motivation or purpose to commit cybercrime is very 
complex (Choi, 2015). However, research indicates that the main targets of cybercrime 
are individuals, or an organization and cyber criminals attempt to gain digital properties 
such as digital information and codes. When individuals access the Internet, the valuable 
information and assets in their computer are exposed to computer criminals (Choi, 2008; 
Felson, 1979). The valuable targets online can be violated by a broad realm of 
perpetration such as trespassing, identity theft, cyber harassment, cyber stalking, or 
vandalism (Brikbeck and LaFree, 1993; Bernburg and Thorlindsson, 2001; Choi, 2015; 
Yar,2001).  
 Inertia.  Yar (2005) and Choi (2015) state that inertia and suitability have an 
inverse relationship. When the level of the inertial resistance increases, the level of target 
suitability for cybercrime will be decreased. Choi (2008, 2015) argues that target 
suitability in the virtual world is more active than the physical world because cyber 
criminals’ technologies and committing cybercrime skills are being advanced at a 
breaking rate when compared to the advancement rate of cybersecurity technologies (Yar, 
2005; Choi, 2008, 2015). In other words, the level of inertia in virtual space is very low; 
pools of computer perpetrators and cybercriminals easily attack suitable targets online.   
 Visibility. According to Yar (2005), targets of cybercrime can be globally exposed 
and visible to cyber criminals in cyberspace. In other words, the characteristic of 
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visibility within the cyber-environment accelerate cyber criminals to find attractive 
targets and commit deviance “from anywhere in the world” (Choi, 2008, p. 21). 
Cybercriminals can obtain the digital data from online users by utilizing efficient tools 
such as I.P. Trackers or Password Sniffers, Spyware, and Scams software (Choi, 2008, 
2015; Internet Crime Report, 2014). 
 Accessibility. The accessibility of crime targets is defined as the ability of cyber 
criminals to approach the target and then escape from the cybercrime scene without any 
difficulty (Choi, 2015; Kubic, 2001). Since national and international boundaries are not 
circumscribed in cyberspace, cyber perpetrators can access and get away from the scene 
of cybercrimes without limitation of time and borders.  
 Plenty of motivated offenders and suitable victims are at “zero distance” from all 
others in the virtual environment and online interpersonal crimes are remotely committed 
from across the country or even across the world (Yar 2005, p. 415; Hazelwood & Koon-
Magnin 2013). With that in mind, motivated offenders and suitable target factors are 
apparently a fully given situation. Therefore, this study will not include the measurement 
of motivated offenders and suitable targets reflecting Choi’s (2008) cyber-routine 
activities theory assumption.  
Online Lifestyle 
 Choi (2008) linked the lifestyle exposure theory to cyberspace such as “vocational 
activities and leisure activities in cyberspace, online risk-taking behavior, and properly 
managing computer security systems” (p. 26). A person’s vocational and leisure activities 
are the key factors to making him/her a suitable target (Choi, 2008). During online 
activities in cyberspace, individuals can persistently interact with other online users 
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through online toolkits and smartphone apps such as e-mail, online messengers, and 
SNSs. Also, the online users set up their own lifestyle by joining “various cyber 
communities based on their particular interests, such as cyber-café’s, clubs, and bulletin 
boards” (Choi, 2008, p. 13). Similarly, the individuals may also join smartphone apps for 
dating and SNSs. They are more likely to be suitable targets for online sexual crime than 
someone who does not join such smartphone apps.  
 According to Choi (2008), online risky behaviors such as illegally downloading 
programs or media files and visiting unknown websites increased the students’ risk of 
virus victimization (Reyns, 2011). Also, individuals who perform risk-taking behaviors 
on social networking sites are likely to become victims of cybercrime.  
 In addition, cyber-harassment is easily committed in the virtual world due to the 
features of cyber space. Sherman et al. (1989) argue that there is certain “hot spots” in the 
physical world where crimes routinely occur. Sherman et al. (1989) explain that the 
places - bars, liquor stores, bus depots, homeless shelters, downtown malls, and theaters - 
are regarded as the hot spots for crime in the physical world. Like the physical world’s 
hot spots for crimes, Holt (2012) posited that there exist some hot spots in the virtual 
world. For example, online users who frequently go to hot spots (e.g., online dating sites, 
SNSs, and sexual web forum sites) are more likely to be victimized by cybercrime (Choi, 
2005; Holt, 2007).  
 The Ashley Madison case is a representative example that demonstrates how 
online users and social networking service providers can jeopardize themselves in a hot 
spot (online dating site) due to their online risky behavior. In fact, the popular online 
dating service company, Ashely Madison, was hacked by cybercriminals who have 
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threatened to release the personal data of 37 million members of the site such as financial 
transaction information, user profiles, passwords, and nude photos (NewYorkTimes, July 
2015). Cybercrime professionals analyzed that this case was a phishing attack: An 
employee at Ashley Madison may have clicked a link that allowed a hacker to collect the 
customers’ information from the company database (BBC, July 2015).  
 Similar to cyber-routine activities theory, other cyber criminologists such as Holt, 
Reyns, Marcum, and Hinduja have conducted risky online lifestyle studies that contribute 
to online sexual crime victimization. Holt (2009) mainly focuses on using a cyber-routine 
activities framework to examine the causal factors for online harassment victimization for 
college students and his study found that risky online activities increased college students’ 
risks for online harassment (Holt, 2009; Reyns et al., 2011). Reyns (2012; 2013) also 
empirically tests the cyber-routine activities theory for assessing cyberstalking and cyber-
harassment. He found that online risk-taking behavior contributed to the phenomenon of 
cyberstalking victimization.  
 This study seeks to analyze the behaviors of Korean SNS users regarding the core 
concepts of the following statements: “what you are doing to protect yourself, where you 
are, what your behaviors are” during online activities (Mustain & Tewksbury, 1998, p. 
852; Choi, 2008). Unlike the previous studies, that used physical digital guardianship 
measures, this study measures specifically cybersecurity guardianship measures on SNSs 





 This chapter presents the research methods that are used to empirically assess the 
cyber harassment victimization of South Korean citizens. The specific sampling 
techniques, procedures, and the method of data analysis are presented below.  
Sampling and Procedures 
 This study utilizes secondary data from the 2013 Korean Institute of Criminology 
(KIC) survey. Survey research is a research design that reflects a standard tool, as “a 
systematic way to take measures from a large number of units” (Maxfield & Babbie, 
2011, p. 256). Also, survey research can be utilized for descriptive, explanatory, 
exploratory, and applied research (Maxfield & Babbie, 2011). The unit of analysis for 
this study is individual online users in South Korea.  
 The KIC’s original survey was designed to examine Koreans’ SNS usages and its 
related online behaviors. Individual in urban areas: Seoul, Gyeongki, and Incheon in 
South Korea were chosen to participate in the survey. The sample consisted of 1000 SNS 
users from age 14 to age 59 in South Korea because these people were able to fully 
understand survey questions and were the majority to use social networking sites. 11.7% 
of respondents were in their teens; 31.4% of respondents were in their 20’s; 28.5% of 
respondents were in their 30’s; 19.4% of respondents were in their 40’s; and 9% of 
respondents were in their 50’s  (KIC, 2014). The survey was conducted by the Korean 
Institute of Criminology from July of 2013 to August of 2013. 
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Hypotheses and Measures 
 The specific measures for the assessment of the cyber harassment victimization 
are demonstrated in this section. In that sense, the cyber-routine activities theoretical 
components (Choi, 2008; Cohen & Felson, 1979; Hindelang, 1978): (1) capable 
guardianship and (2) online lifestyles will be utilized to determine cybercrime 
victimization data that were collected from the Korean Institute of Criminology. The 
survey contained a series of questions gauging respondents’ online behavior, exposure to 
online risk-taking behavior, self-reported victimization, and demographic characteristics.  
 With that in mind, the current study seeks to address the major deficiencies in the 
criminological literature, especially as it pertains to cybercrime victimization through 
SNSs. The specific hypotheses in this study include:  
Hypothesis 1. Strict cybersecurity settings on SNSs minimize cyber-harassment 
victimization. 
Hypothesis 2. Active engagement in vocational and leisure activities on SNSs increase 
cyber-harassment victimization. 
Hypothesis 3. Engagement in online risky behaviors increases cyber-harassment 
victimization. 
Hypothesis 4. Formal and informal capable guardianship reduces cyber-harassment 
victimization. 
Dependent Variable 
 This study used four items adapted from the 2013 Korean Institute of 
Criminology survey. Respondents were asked within the last 12 months: (a) Despite your 
rejection of his or her messages, someone consistently sent you messages; (b) you have 
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repeatedly been threatened by receiving fearful messages, pictures and/or movies; (c) 
someone has used swearwords at you or threatened you on SNSs; (d) you have received 
sexual content through the Internet without your consent. Responses to these survey 
items were dichotomized (0=No, 1=Yes) and created a dependent variable: cyber-
harassment.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Measures  
VARIABLES Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Response Variable     
Cyber Harassment .16 .51 .00 4.00 
Online Vocational and Leisure 
Activities 
    
Usage of SNS (Facebook) 









Number of updates to SNS 
(Facebook) 














Uploading number of photos on 
SNS (Facebook) 






















.00 .00 .00 .00 
Cyber security setting on SNSs  
+ Security application on SNSs 
2.35 1.18 .00 6.00 
Online Risky Activities     
Illegally downloading software 
online + Downloading porn 
videos/movies + Slandering 
someone online 
.12 .32 .00 1.00 
Control Variables     
Age 32.75 11.47 14 59 
Gender .51 .50 .00 1.00 
     
Independent Variables 
 Three sets of independent variables in the subsequent analyses: (a) digital 
guardian measure, (b) online lifestyle measure, and (c) demographic information assessed 
in the subsequent analyses.   
 Digital Guardianship. Cyber Security on SNSs: The researchers argue that 
digital-capable guardianship is the most important tenet to prevent computer crime and 
cyber crime (Choi, 2008; Holt & Bossler, 2009). This study measured the degree of cyber 
security on SNSs and using security applications on SNSs as digital guardianship. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement using a 
Likert Scale: (a) I set my security of SNSs so that strangers can access my SNS accounts 
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without my permission; (b) I use an application to make new friendships on SNSs. The 
items were anchored by strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree. A measure 
of the respondent’s mean cyber security on SNSs was created (Cronbach’s alpha = .724) 
 Online Vocational and Leisure Activities. Following Choi’s (2008) study, online 
lifestyle measure is composed of two observed facets: vocational and leisure activities, 
and risky activities. First, the researcher will utilize ten survey items for the measure of 
vocational and leisure activities. Specifically, respondents were asked how they used the 
SNSs in their daily life within the previous 12 months: (1) what kinds of SNSs you 
belong to; (2) how many accounts of SNSs you have; (3) what the usage rate of SNSs is; 
(4) how many hours/minutes a day you spend time on SNSs; (5) how many photos and 
video clips you upload within a week; (6) how many postings you upload within a week; 
(7) what your main purposes for using SNSs are; (8) what your main activities for using 
SNSs are; (9) how many unknown friend connections you have on SNSs; (10) what kinds 
of personal information you open to the public.  
 Online Risky Behavior. Individuals’ online risky behaviors measured in KIC’s 
survey. These include using the Internet for the following purpose: (1) illegally 
downloading software online, (2) watching or downloading porn videos/movies online, or 
(3) slandering someone online. Respondents will be coded (options: 1=Strongly disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Agree, 4=Strongly agree). A measure of the respondent’s online risky 
behavior was created (Cronbach’s alpha = .68).  
 This study controlled for age and gender. Age is measured in years at the time of 
the survey. The respondents were asked: “How old are you?” Gender is a dichotomous 
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variable differentiating male (51%) and female (49%) respondents (0=female and 
1=male).  
 Choi, Choo, & Sung (2015) study results demonstrate that gender difference is 
associated with risky leisure and vocational activities and security management (Choi et 
al., 2015). Also, Choi et al. (2015) found that age difference is statistically associated 
with online lifestyle factors and computer crime victimization. For example, younger 
online users were more likely to become engaged in risky vocational and leisure activities. 
Other studies (Holt, 2009; Reyns, 2011) indicated that age and gender variables did 
significantly influence the likelihood of online sexual crime victimization, including 
cyber stalking and cyber harassment. 
 Interestingly, although age and gender differences statistically contributed to the 
computer crime/cybercrime victimization in previous research (Choi, 2015; Holt, 2009; 
Reyns, 2011), age and gender factors in this current study do not significantly influence 
cyber harassment victimization of South Korean online users.  
Analytic Plan 
 Through the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program, negative 
binomial regression was used to assess cyber harassment victimization. Because of the 
skewed nature of the data, negative binomial regression is an appropriate statistical 
technique for measuring the relationships between cyber routine activities theory and 
cyber harassment victimization. Usually, negative binomial regression can be utilized for 
over-dispersed count variables, especially when the conditional variance exceeds the 
conditional mean (UCLA, January 2015). In addition, it can be employed to “predict the 
value of the dependent variable on the basis of the independent variables” (Fox, Levin, & 
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Shively, 2002, p. 335). It was hypothesized that measures of digital capable guardianship, 
online risky behavior, and online vocational and leisure activities from cyber-routine 







  We estimated negative binomial regression models with cyber harassment 
victimization as the dependent variable. The significant results based on the negative 
binomial regression analysis can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates of Cyber Harassment  
by Negative Binomial Regression Model 
  Negative Binomial Regression Model 


























Unknown Friend 0.03 0.01 30.43 1.03** 
Note: The Negative Binomial dispersion parameters were estimated by maximum 
likelihood. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
Cyber Security on Social Networking Sites 
 The cyber security setting on SNSs that can block a stranger access, and the 
security application allows social networking users to make friends on SNSs. As Table 2 
illustrates, the cyber security on SNS variable was found to have a significant effect on 
the likelihood of cyber harassment victimization. The cyber security setting and security 
application are designed to increase the level of cyber security on SNSs against cyber 
deviance. Our models indicate that those who have a lower level of cyber security on 
SNSs are 26% more likely to be cyber harassed (b = .24 and Odds Ratio = 1.27 with p 
< .001). Age and gender were not significant in this relationship.  
 Risky Online Behavior 
 As Table 2 shows, risky online behavior is a significant predictor of cyber 
harassment victimization. Online risky behavior refers to illegally downloading software, 
porn movies from an unknown website and is characterized with slandering others online. 
The online users who display the online risky behaviors are 20% more likely to be 
victimized by cybercriminals (b = .18 Odds Ratio = 1.20 with p < .001). Age and gender 
were not significant in the relationships between social networking users participating in 
online risky behaviors and cyber harassment.    
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 Online Vocational and Leisure Activities 
 Among ten online vocational and leisure activities variables, only one variable is 
moderately significant: the relationship between cyber harassment victimization and the 
number of unknown friends on social networking sites. The more relationships with 
unknown friends online users had, their cyber-harassment victimization was increased by 
about 3% (b = .03 Odds Ratio = 1.03, and p < .01). Also, age and gender were not 
significant in this relationship.    
 The following chapter discusses the findings of this study and provides policy 





 This study tested cyber-routine activities theory (Choi, 2008), which was 
originally derived from Hindelang et al. (1978) lifestyle-exposure theory and Cohen and 
Felson’s (1979) routine activities theory. Most studies on cyber-harassment and cyber-
stalking have focused on the specific demographic range of college students (Choi, 2008; 
Finn2004; Higgins et al., 2014; Holt, 2009; Reynes et al., 2011). Interestingly, this study 
focused on the broad demographic range, from age 14 to age 59, in South Korea.  
 The results of the study demonstrate that two causal factors from cyber-routine 
activities theory – lack of cyber security on SNSs and online risky behavior – have 
impacted the likelihood of cyber harassment victimization (Choi, 2008; Finn2004; 
Higgins et al., 2014; Holt, 2009; Reynes et al., 2011). In general, the computer security 
software (Choi, 2008; Holt, 2009; Higgins, 2007) and the computer user’s security 
awareness (Arachchchilage & Love, 2014) should decrease the likelihood of 
victimization by digital piracy, malware infection, and hacking. However, they do not 
decrease the likelihood of online sexual crime (e.g., cyber-harassment and cyber-stalking). 
These findings support previous research that found cyber security settings on SNSs 
instead of computer security software is directly related to preventing cyber harassment.  
 With respect to targets’ online exposure activities, spending a lot of time on SNSs 
increases the risk of diversified victimization online (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Ngo & 
Paternoster, 2011; Wilsem, 2013). Reyens et al. (2011) found that four online exposure 
variables: Number of social networks, number of social network updates, photos on 
social network, and AOL instant messenger, are associated with statistically significant 
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increases in the likelihood of victimization. Although the study expected similar findings 
to what Reyens et al. (2011) previously examined, the actual findings from this empirical 
study show that the majority of variables from online vocational and leisure activities are 
not significantly related with cyber-harassment victimization. Only one of the ten 
variables (e.g., number of unknown friends on social networking sites) from online 
vocational and leisure activities is significantly associated with victimization.   
 Age was a significant demographic factor in the previous studies on this subject 
(Bossler et al., 2012; Holt & Bossler, 2009; Wilsem, 2013). Youth had higher 
possibilities of being harassed online, whereas cyber-harassment victims in this study 
were distributed over a wide demographic range. Our findings indicate that the various 
ages of SNS users and cyber-harassment victims in South Korea implied a unique cyber-
culture and online social environment when compared to other studies focused on 
younger generation (e.g., youth or college students) of individual nations. 
 Overall, the results of the analysis provide noteworthy insights into the capable 
guardian and online risky behavior tenets from cyber-routine activities theory. These vital 
aspects can contribute to the development of crime prevention programs in various ways. 
Based on this study, policy implications can be derived from the two elements of cyber-
routine activities theory: capable guardians and online risky behavior. 
 The first step to prevention is Cybersecurity and Protection programs on SNS. 
This research indicates that the individuals who had a lower level of cyber security 
settings on SNSs were more likely to be harassed. Cybersecurity experts suggest the best 
way to prevent individuals from becoming cyber-harassment victims is to educate online 
users on how to enforce cyber security on SNSs (Donkersley, April 2013). Features of 
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cyber-security on SNSs provide users with authorizations, including the following: (1) 
defining in considerable detail how their personal profiles are displayed online; (2) 
controlling who accesses their social networking accounts (Hogben, 2007, p1). In this 
sense, the program should have efficient practices that individuals could learn how to set 
the cyber security setting so that only those users who were linked to their accounts as 
“friends” could view their profile information on social networks and access to their 
accounts (Henson et al., 2011). Recently, some SNS providers managed social network 
security programs such as Stay Secure on Facebook Program in order to build better 
security awareness for online users (Facebook, July 2015). As discussed above, 
KaKaoStory is one of the most popular SNSs in all of South Korea, but does not 
currently have a cyber security program. This research suggests that KaKaoStory 
Corporation should implement some such cybersecurity and protection on SNS programs 
to better protect its users from online threats. If the Korean society utilized these types of 
security programs to educate online users, cyber-harassment victimization in South Korea 
can be minimized.    
 In addition, while individual SNS users may strengthen their cyber security levels 
on SNSs, cyber criminals are potentially able to commit a breach of SNS users’ 
information because of the advanced technologies utilized in stealing individuals’ 
information (Federal Communications Commission, 2015). Therefore, as a related step 
with cyber security setting on SNSs, this study suggests that SNS providers supplement 
the cryptographic functions that support SNS users’ encryption in order to enhance the 
cyber security level on SNSs. Some public web servers have recently offered 
cryptographic techniques as an aim of protection for sensitive personal data such as birth 
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date, job, photos, group membership, cell phone number, and e-mail address (Donkersley, 
2013; Federal Communications Commission, 2015). Hopefully, SNS providers can 
improve protection of SNS users from the breach of personal information that is possibly 
utilized for committing potential cybercrime, especially online interpersonal crime. In 
short, if both cyber security setting and cryptographic functions are accurately 
implemented to reinforce SNS users’ security, it may help to minimize cyber-harassment 
victimization in South Korea.  
 The second step to prevention is Don’t Click programs. Don’t Click programs 
mainly promote identification and avoidance of malicious situations (Choi et al., 2015; 
Microsoft, December 2015; Terry and Ackerman 2008; Wortley and Smallbone 2006). 
The results of this study indicate that online users who have a tendency to become 
involved in risky online behaviors were more likely to be victimized by cyber-harassment 
than individuals with non-risky online behaviors. Thus, the prevention programs should 
include how to identify and control risky online behaviors that can trigger a malicious 
situation on SNSs. It is highly recommended that online users become educated about the 
specific risky online behaviors via utilizing the effective guidelines so that they are aware 
of the potential for victimization (Marcum et al., 2010). For example, online users can 
realize the fact that clicking pop-up advertisement, digital icons, or hyperlinks on web 
sites or SNSs impact the likelihood of cybercrime victimization, including online 
interpersonal victimization (Choi, 2008; Holt & Bossler, 2009; Marcum, 2010; Reyns, 
2010; Wolak et al., 2007). According to the Symantec “2015 Internet Security Threat 
Report”, the cyber threats leveraging social network scams such as manual sharing, fake 
offering, like-jacking, comment-jacking, and fake apps are serious problems in the virtual 
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world (InfoSec Institute, September 2015). In fact, some social network users tend to 
click on malicious links or fake offers posted by a friend or stranger without concerns of 
risks (InfoSec Institute, September 2015). Therefore, the risk-taking behavior instigates 
online users to get involved with online interpersonal violence. The Don’t Click program 
can enhance the Korean SNS users’ knowledge level about the various types of risky 
online situations as delineated above. 
 The third step to prevention is Cyber-security Awareness Culture programs. The 
Cybersecurity Awareness Culture programs consist of sharing and operating 
cybersecurity on SNSs so that online users can easily be educated about cyber security 
and safe online lifestyle on SNSs. Public sector, private sector, and academia are all 
important stakeholders in preventing cyber-harassment (Ybarra el al., 2007; Kraft & 
Wang, 2009). Hence, their cooperation is necessary to build a better security awareness 
culture in Korean society. The prevention programs could be categorized as school-based 
prevention programs because the school-based programs may be the first stage that 
students could learn specific guidelines for preventing cyber-crime in the classroom and 
the community at large (Choi, 2015). If the prevention program could be interactive and 
have an interesting environment with cyber-security and online lifestyle issues instead of 
fear, students would feel comfortable with conversations about cyber-security and risky 
online lifestyle on social networks and raise potential concerns without hesitation. 
Moreover, students would effectively learn cyber-security lessons (Facebook, November 
2014). In other words, when we educate students with an adequately structured cyber 
prevention program, the beneficial outcomes should be expected by establishing 
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individuals’ appropriate online lifestyle and establishing their own protections during the 
usage of social networks (Choi, 2015).  
 This study had a number of limitations that should be considered for future 
research. Since the purpose of KIC data was to delineate the Koreans’ social networking 
usages and their related behaviors, the theoretical assessment for cyber-security, online 
lifestyle, cyber-harassment measures was imperfect. In addition, measuring more 
accurate individual victimization patterns using online lifestyle and the use of cyber- 
security requires longitudinal data. However, this survey was the first national data 
collection on the response of social networking services in South Korea, which was 
collected as a cross-sectional format. We hope to see longitudinal data on the social 
networking service survey and use more refined measures for the assessment of cyber-
harassment victimization in the near future.  
 Also, assessing formal/informal guardianship factors were limited in this study. 
Some researchers in previous studies did not believe that the formal/informal 
guardianship factors substantially minimized the likelihood of interpersonal cybercrime 
(Holt, 2009; Reyns, 2011; Yar, 2005). However, formal/informal capable guardianship 
may be very imperative factors that can effectively help to minimize cybercrime, 
including cyber-harassment, if it accurately works. Therefore, future research needs to 
consider formal/informal guardianship factors as major measures in research for 







 The cyber-harassment victimization model demonstrates the relationships 
between capable guardianship and online lifestyle variables with cyber-harassment 
victimization. In terms of capable guardianship variables, the cyber security and the 
security applications on SNSs are significant factors in preventing cyber-harassment 
victimization. Also, the model shows that risky online behavior is significantly associated 
with an increase in cyber-harassment victimization. Finally, the online vocational and 
leisure activities are moderately associated with an increased likelihood of victimization. 
Our current study is a substantial theoretical test of cyber-routine activities theory (2008), 
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Appendix I: Survey Instrument 
 
 







Instructions:  Please complete the section below by filling in or checking off the selection that 
best suits you.  
 
 
SQ1. Which region do you live? 
(1) Seoul Metropolitan City 
1) Jongno-gu 2) Jung-gu 3) Yongsan-gu 4) Sungdong-gu 5) Gwanjin-gu 6) Dongdaemun-gu 7) 
Jungnang-gu 8) Seongbuk-gu 9) Gangbuk-gu 10) Dobong-gu 11) Nowon-gu 12) Eunpyeong-gu 
13) Seodaemun-gu 14) Mapo 15) Yangcheon-gu 16) Gangseo-gu 17) Guro-gu 18) Geumcheon-
gu 19) Yeongdeungpo-gu 20) Dongjak-gu 21) Gwanak-gu 22) Seocho-gu 23) Gangnam-gu 24) 
Songpa-gu 25) Gangdong-gu 
 
(2) Incheon City and Gyeonggi Province 
26) Incheon city 27) Suwon city 28) Seongnam city 29) Uijeongbu city 30) Anyang city 31) 
Bucheon city 32) Gwangmyeong city 33) Pyeongtaek city 34) Dongducheon city 35) Ansan city 
36) Goyang city 37) Gwacheon city 38) Guri city 39) Namyangju city 40) Osan city 41) Siheung 
The Korean Institute of Criminology, which mainly focuses on researching criminal phenomenon 
and policy implications, is under the Prime Minister office in South Korea. Recently, the Korean 
Institute of Criminology has researched using status and victimization of Social Networking sites. 
Based on these surveys, KIC will establish an alternative to prevent cybercrime. Therefore, your 
participation will be valuable and helpful to conduct this research. Your survey data will be 
anonymously used for the processing of the statistical analysis. Also, KIC will only use your 
survey data for academic purposes. KIC will absolutely keep your personal information private. 
On behalf of the Korean Institute of Criminology, we appreciate your participation.      
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city 42) Gunpo city 43) Uiwang city 44) Hanam city 45) Yongin city 46) Paju city 47) Icheon city 
48) Anseong city 49) Gimpo city 50) Hwaseong city 51) Gwangju city 52) Yangju city 53) 
Pocheon city 
 
SQ2. What is your gender? 
(1) Male 
(2) Female 
SQ3. How old are you?_______ Write down what year you were born _________. 
1) 10s (_____, __________)              2) 20s (_____, __________) 
3) 30s (_____, __________)              4) 40s (_____, __________) 
5) 50s (_____, __________)               
 
 













Q1. Firstly, the survey question will start with the status of using Social Network sites. 
 
Q1-1. Do you use Social Networking sites? 
(1) Yes 
(0) No 
If you answer ‘yes’, what kinds of Social Network sites do you belong to? 
 
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(1) Yes   (2) No (1) Yes   (2) No (1) Yes   (2) No (1) Yes   (2) No 
 
 
Q1-2. How many accounts (e.g., ID) of Social Networking sites do you have? 
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(        ) (        ) (        ) (        ) 
For the following questions, please note that: 
Social Networking Sites: websites that connect people together by 
allowing them to share interests and activities with friends, family, 
colleagues, as well as people with similar interests. 
Smartphone: phones that have abilities similar to computers allowing 
users to access the Internet as well as download applications or 
programs onto their phone. 
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Q1-3. Which device do you use for Social Networking sites the most? Please pick only 
one 
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(1) Smartphone 
(2) Tablet PC 
(3) Desktop/Notebook 
(4) Computer in 
public places 
(1) Smartphone 
(2) Tablet PC 
(3) Desktop/Notebook 
(4) Computer in 
public places 
(1) Smartphone 
(2) Tablet PC 
(3) Desktop/Notebook 
(4) Computer in 
public places 
(1) Smartphone 
(2) Tablet PC 
(3) Desktop/Notebook 
(4) Computer in 
public places 
 
Q1-4. If the total usage of SNS is 100%, what is the usage rate of each social network 
site?  
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(        )% (        )% (        )% (        )% 
 
Q1-5. Do you have a specific time to use Social Network sites? Or just randomly use it? 
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(1) Specific time 
(2) Random time 
 
(1) Specific time 
(2) Random time 
 
(1) Specific time 
(2) Random time 
 
(1) Specific time 
(2) Random time 
 
 
Q1-6. On average, how many hours/minutes a day do you spend time on Social 
Networking sites? 
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(1) 0 ~ 30min  
(2) 30min ~ 1hour 
(3) 1hour ~ 2hours 
(4) 2hour ~ 3hours 
(5) 3hours ~ 4hours 
(6) 4hours ~ 5hours 
(7) Over 5hours 
(1) 0 ~ 30min  
(2) 30min ~ 1hour 
(3) 1hour ~ 2hours 
(4) 2hour ~ 3hours 
(5) 3hours ~ 4hours 
(6) 4hours ~ 5hours 
(7) Over 5hours 
(1) 0 ~ 30min  
(2) 30min ~ 1hour 
(3) 1hour ~ 2hours 
(4) 2hour ~ 3hours 
(5) 3hours ~ 4hours 
(6) 4hours ~ 5hours 
(7) Over 5hours 
(1) 0 ~ 30min  
(2) 30min ~ 1hour 
(3) 1hour ~ 2hours 
(4) 2hour ~ 3hours 
(5) 3hours ~ 4hours 
(6) 4hours ~ 5hours 
(7) Over 5hours 
 
 
Q1-7. On average, how many photo and video clips do you upload within a week? 
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 
(4) Over 11 
 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 
(4) Over 11 
 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 
(4) Over 11 
 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 





Q1-8. On average, how many postings do you upload within a week? (The methods of 
posting include posting content, commenting, clicking the button for like or dislike, 
tweeting and re-tweeting).     
Facebook Twitter KaKaostory Cyworld 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 
(4) Over 11 
 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 
(4) Over 11 
 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 
(4) Over 11 
 
(1) 0  
(2) 1~ 5 
(3) 6 ~10 





Part B: Purpose and Activity on Social Networking Sites 
 
Q2. What is your main purpose for using Social Networking sites? Please choose your 
top 2 choices from the list below. 
(1) Friendship and conversation (2) Building-up new relationships (friend and dating) 
(3) Information and Knowledge (4) Marketing for company 
(5) Entertainment and leisure (6) Following trends 
(7) Removing stress  (8) Self-expression 
(9) Others _______________ 
 
Q3. What are your main activities for using Social Networking sites? Please choose your 
top 2 choices from the list below. 
(1) Recording personal life (2) Sharing Information and knowledge 
(3) Sharing a personal idea   (4) Only monitoring other’s posting 
(5) Reading and responding to others’ postings  
(6) Promoting personal events and advertisements 
(7) Building-up new relationships (requesting friendship and followership)   
(8) Others _______________ 
 
Q4. The following questions are in regard to the function and characteristic of 















Social Networking sites can 
strengthen relationships with 











Social Networking sites can 
strengthen relationships with 











Social Networking sites can 
offer useful information for 












Social Networking sites can 











Social Networking sites can 
strengthen the level of interest 












Social Networking sites can 
offer chances to understand 










Q4-7 Social Networking sites are 










Q4-8 Social Networking sites can be 
















Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q4-9 Social Networking sites are 









Q4-10 Social Networking sites are 











Q4-11 Social Networking sites can be 









Q4-12 Social Networking sites can 










Q4-13 Social Networking sites can 










Q4-14 Social Networking sites can 









Q4-15 Social Networking sites can 










Q4-16 Social Networking sites create 










Q4-17 Social Networking sites are 
consecutively correlated with 









Q4-18 Social Networking sites are 












Q5. How many connections do you have on Social Networking sites? Please write in 
the appropriate answer based on mostly using social networking sites. Please pick 







Q5-1 Family/Relative (               ) people 
Q5-2 Friend/Peer (               ) people 
Q5-3 Coworker/Work related person  (               ) people 
Q5-4 Person who has the same hobby and interests (               ) people 
Q5-5 Celebrity/Sports star (               ) people 
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Q5-6 Famous person (except celebrity/sports star) (               ) people 
Q5-7 Friendship that was built on the Internet  (               ) people 
Q5-8 Company/Media company/Government/ 
Government-owned corporation 
(               ) people 
Q5-9 Unknown person (               ) people 
Q5-10 Other__________ (               ) people 
   
Q6. Do you usually make friendships via Social Networking Sites on the Internet? Or do 
you meet most of your friends in the real world before having friendships on 
Social Networking Sites?   
(1) I met most of them online sites first.   
(2) I met most of them via offline sites first. 
(3) The ratio of meeting friends is half online and half offline. 
 
Q7. Do you open your personal information to the public? Please check it, based 






Open information Closed information 
Q7-1 Real name (1) (2) 
Q7-2 Gender (1) (2) 
Q7-3 Age (1) (2) 
Q7-4 Profession (1) (2) 
Q7-5 Company/School (1) (2) 
Q7-6 Residential address (1) (2) 
Q7-7 Interests (1) (2) 
Q7-8 E-mail address (1) (2) 
Q7-9 Cell number (1) (2) 
Q7-10 Messenger ID (1) (2) 
Q7-11 Other SNS address (1) (2) 
Q7-12 Photo (1) (2) 
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Q7-13 Relationship status (1) (2) 
 
Q8. The following questions focus on capable guardianship. Please pick one in 





Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q8-1 I set my security of SNS so that 
strangers can access my social 














Q8-2 I use an application to make new 












 Part C: Knowledge level about Social Networking sites 
 
Q9.  What is your knowledge level about using Social Networking? 
(1) Basic level 
(2) Intermediate level 
 (3) Advanced level 
 
Q10. Instruction: The following questions are regarding your use of SNS. Please 
 pick one in each question. 
 
Content Yes No 
 Q10-1 I understand the meaning and concept of SNS (1) (2) 
Q10-2 I spend more time on my social networking sites than using 
e-mail and text message.  
(1) (2) 
Q10-3 I can easily communicate with most of my acquaintances by 
using Social Networking sites.  
(1) (2) 
Q10-4 I can use various types of devices (e.g., laptop, smartphone, 
tablet PC) for operating Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q10-5 I can use games, programs, and services that are provided by 
Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q10-6 I have several management programs and applications for my 
Social Networking sites accounts.  
(1) (2) 
Q10-7 I understand the fact that even though I delete postings on 
Social Networking sites; it is possible to save the content on 
(1) (2) 
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network servers.  
Q10-8 I recognize the fact that even though I delete postings on 
Social Networking sites; it is possible to save the content on 
search engines and specific website servers. 
(1) (2) 
Q10-9 I know how to use security programs for logins on Social 
Networking sites.  
(1) (2) 
Q10-10 When I try to register onto Social Networking sites, I always 







 Part D: Victimization on Social Networking sites 
 
Q11. The following questions are only for middle and high school students. Please 
 pick one based on the statements below regarding your mostly using Social 
 Networking sites in the past 12 months. Please pick one in each question. 
 
Content Yes No 
Q11-1 Have your schoolmates bullied you by using unpleasant 
nicknames on Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q11-2 Have your schoolmates uploaded unwanted postings, 
pictures and video clips? 
(1) (2) 
Q11-3 Have your schoolmates released your secrets without 
your permission? 
(1) (2) 
Q11-4 Have your schoolmates shared some interesting 
information with each other excluding you? 
(1) (2) 






Q12. The following questions focus on asking your experiences on Social 
 Networking sites in the past 12 months. 
 
Content Yes  No 
Q12-1 Have you been consistently rejected by someone in the 
application of friendship and membership on Social 
Networking sites?  
(1) (2) 
Q12-2 Have you experienced deception with a great prize and 
coupons on Social Networking sites?  
(1) (2) 
For the following questions, please note: 





   
Q13. The following questions focus on asking about your experiences in the  
 physical world in the past 12 months. Please pick one in each question. 
 
Content Yes  No 
Q13-1 Has your house been broken into when you were not 
home?  
(1) (2) 
Q13-2 Have you ever been robbed at home? (1) (2) 
Q13-3 Have you ever been pickpocketed in public?  (1) (2) 
Q13-4 Has you ever been assaulted or threatened by anyone in 
public? 
(1) (2) 
Q13-5 Has anyone deprived you of money or valuables in 
public? 
(1) (2) 
Q13-6 Have you been sexually assaulted by anyone in public? (1) (2) 
 
 
 Part E: After the experience of victimization on Social Networking sites 
 
Instructions: If you answered ‘yes’ at least more than once from the part D  
questions, please answer the following questions. 
 
Q14. Have you reported the criminal issue(s) related to the part D questions to a police 
officer? 
(1) I have never reported it  (2) I have reported it 
Q12-3 Has your personal information been stolen because you 
were deceived on Social Networking sites? 
(1) (2) 
Q12-4 Have you ever been impersonated on Social Networking 
sites? 
(1) (2) 
Q12-5 Has someone used your pictures and movies or personal 
information without your permission on Social Networking 
sites?  
(1) (2) 
Q12-6 Has someone spread rumors or untruthful facts about you 
on Social Networking sites? 
(1) (2) 
Q12-7 Has someone damaged your reputation by slandering you 
(without the use of swearwords) on Social Networking 
sites?  
(1) (2) 
Q12-8 Has someone used swearwords at you or threatened you on 
Social Networking sites? 
(1) (2) 
Q12-9 Despite your rejection of his or her messages, has someone 
consistently sent you messages?   
(1) (2) 
Q12-10 Have you ever been threatened by receiving fearful 
messages, pictures and/or movies? 
(1) (2) 
Q12-11 Have you received illegal sexual content through the 
Internet without your consent? 
(1) (2) 





Q14-1. If you did not report it, what was the reason? 
 (1) I did not feel like taking the time to report it to the police 
 (2) I thought the evidence of the crime was not enough to catch the  
offender 
 (3) I felt like the police don’t have the ability to catch the offender 
 (4) I was worried about what my personal life might have been like under   
    the exposure of police 
 (5) I thought it was not an issue to report to the police 
 (6) My victimization was not serious 
 (7) I worried about revenge from the offender 
 
Q14-2. If you reported it, what was the result after reporting it? 
(1) I was totally satisfied with the service of the police and the offender was     
   captured 
(2) I was satisfied with the service of the police, but the offender was not captured 
(3) I was not satisfied with the service of the police, but the offender was   
   captured 
(4) I was not satisfied with the service of the police and the offender was not  
   captured 
 
Q15. After victimization on SNS, have you ever reported it to the provider of SNS? 
 (1) I did not  (2) I did 
 
 
Q15-1. If you did not, what was the reason? 
 (1) My victimization was not serious  
 (2) I did not feel like taking the time to report it to the provider 
 (3) I thought it was not an issue to report to the company 
 (4) I thought even if I report it, it might not be changed 
 
Q15-2. If you reported it, how satisfied were you in doing so? 
 (1) Strongly not satisfied  (2) Not satisfied  
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 (3) Satisfied   (4) Strongly satisfied 
 
Q16. Did you change any online behavior in your SNS activity after victimization? 
 Please pick some. 
 (1) Stopped using SNS   
 (2) SNS deregistration 
 (3) Changed level of personal Information released  
 (4) Changed SNS address and name 
 (5) Changed your SNS password  
 (6) Made a new SNS account 
 (7) Canceled SNS friendships 
 (8) None 
     
  
Q17. The following questions focus on difficulty and pain after victimization.  Please 




Q18. After victimization on SNS, what specific emotional status was changed? 






Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q18-1 When someone attacks 
me, I am confident to 
protect myself. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q18-2 I feel that I am a very 
important person. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q18-3 Level of belief in others (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q18-4 Level of belief in the 
police or criminal justice 
agents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q18-5 Respect for our law 
enforcement system 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Contents Yes  No 
Q17-1 I had depressive disorder. (1) (2) 
Q17-2 I felt lonely.  (1) (2) 
Q17-3 I had fear of victimization. (1) (2) 
Q17-4 I had insomnia, headaches and nightmares. (1) (2) 
Q17-5 I experienced difficulty in having relationships with others. (1) (2) 
Q17-6 I have moved to another place or transferred to another 
school. 
(1) (2) 
Q17-7 I felt like committing suicide.  (1) (2) 




 Part F: The Fear of Social Networking sites 
 










Q19-1 When you are at home alone… (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q19-2 When you walk around your neighborhood 
alone… 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 










Q20-1 I am afraid of being victimized on Social 
Networking sites. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q20-2 I am afraid of my family members being 
victimized on Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q20-3 I am afraid of my friends being victimized 
on Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 










Q21-1 I am afraid that my privacy may be 
exposed through my SNS. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-2 I am afraid of losing my money and 
property because of someone deceiving me 
through SNS.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-3 I am afraid of someone sexually harassing 
me through SNS.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-4 I am afraid of someone, I already know 
through SNS, sexually harassing and 
assaulting me.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-5 I am afraid of someone insulting me and 
trying to damage my reputation through 
SNS.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-6 I am afraid of someone spreading rumors 
or untruthful facts about me through SNS.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Q21-7 I am afraid of my personal information 
being leaked online. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-8 I am afraid of someone impersonating me 
through SNS.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-9 I am afraid of someone deceiving me 
through SNS in order to infect my 
computer and mobile phone with a virus.    
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-10 I am afraid of someone repeatedly sending 
unwanted messages to me through SNS.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-11 I am afraid of someone stealing my money 
and possessions by using my personal 
information that was collected through my 
SNS. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q21-12 I am afraid of someone breaking into my 
house by using my information that was 
collected through my SNS. 




Q22. The following questions focus on the likelihood of victimization on Social 






Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q22-1 I am more likely to be victimized than 
others on SNS. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q22-2 I cannot protect myself from someone 
committing a cybercrime against me on 
SNS. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q22-3 I will be more seriously damaged in the 
long term than others if I am victimized 
on SNS.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 








Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q23-1 I usually install security programs for 
using SNS.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q23-2 I usually reject strangers’ requests for 
friendships and messages. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q23-3 I regularly change my account password 
of SNS. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q23-4 I don’t access SNS without my own (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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mobile phone and Notebook.   
 
 
Q24. The following questions focus on relationships and culture on SNS. Please 










Q24-1 I can trust cyber friendships among online 
users. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q24-2 Cyber friends on SNS share similar ideas.  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q24-3  Individuals in cyber friendships are very 
close. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q24-4 Individuals in cyber friendships tend to help 
each other. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q24-5 If someone slanders an individual and uses 
swearwords at them on SNS, other online 
users will punish these violent acts.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q24-6 If someone posts unhealthy content on SNS, 
other online users will punish these violent 
acts. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q24-7 Cyber friends on SNS have disciplines and 
regulations to keep their healthy culture.     
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q24-8 Cyber friends try to create a healthy culture 
in the SNS environment among each other. 





 Part G: Behavior on the SNS 
 
Q25. The following questions are only for middle and high school students. Please 
pick one based on the statements below regarding your Social Networking site use in 
the past 12 months.  
 
Content Yes No 
Q25-1 I have bullied my schoolmates by using their unpleasant 
nicknames on Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q25-2 I have uploaded my schoolmates’ unwanted postings, 
pictures and video clips. 
(1) (2) 
Q25-3 I have released my schoolmates’ secrets without 
permission. 
(1) (2) 
Q25-4 I have shared my schoolmates’ interesting information 
with other schoolmates through Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q25-5 I have spread rumors or untruthful facts about my 





Q26. The following questions focus on asking your experiences on Social 
 Networking sites in the past 12 months. Please pick one in each question. 
 
Content Yes No 
Q26-1 I have consistently rejected someone’s requests for 
friendship and membership on Social Networking sites.  
(1) (2) 
Q26-2 I have deceived someone through a fake promotion with 
a great prize and coupons on Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q26-3 I have stolen someone’s personal information by making 
a fake link on Social Networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q26-4 I have impersonated another person on Social 
Networking sites.  
(1) (2) 
Q26-5 I have used someone’s pictures and videos or personal 
information without their permission on Social 
networking sites. 
(1) (2) 
Q26-6 I have spread rumors or untruthful facts about someone 
on SNS. 
(1) (2) 
Q26-7 I have damaged someone’s reputation through slander 
(without using swearwords) him or her on SNS.  
(1) (2) 
Q26-8 I have used swearwords at someone or threatened 
someone on SNS. 
(1) (2) 
Q26-9 Despite someone rejecting my messages, I have 
repeatedly sent messages to someone.  
(1) (2) 
Q26-10 I have threatened someone by sending fearful messages, 
pictures and videos. 
(1) (2) 
Q26-11 I have sent sexual messages, pictures and videos on SNS. (1) (2) 





Q27. How many friends or acquaintances relate with Question 26? 
 (1) None (2) Few  (3) Many (4) A lot 
 
Q28.  How often do you interact with cyber friends who relate with Question 26? 
  (1) None (2) Almost none  (3) Sometimes (4) Frequent  
 
Q29.  The following questions focus on the seriousness of issues on SNS. Please pick 






Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q29-1 Consistently rejecting 
someone’s requests for 
friendship and membership 
on Social Networking sites is 
a serious issue for me.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Q29-2 Fake promotions with great 
prizes and coupons on Social 
Networking sites are serious 
issues for me. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-3 Stealing another’s personal 
information through making a 
fake link on Social 
Networking sites is a serious 
issue for me. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-4 Being impersonated by 
another person on Social 
Networking sites is a serious 
issue for me.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-5 Using another’s pictures and 
videos or personal 
information without their 
permission on Social 
Networking sites is a serious 
issue for me. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-6 Spreading rumors or 
untruthful facts about 
someone on SNS is a serious 
issue for me. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-7 Damaging someone’s 
reputation through slandering 
(without using swearwords) 
him or her on SNS is a 
serious issue for me.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-8 Using swearwords at 
someone or threatening 
someone on SNS is a serious 
issue for me. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-9 Someone consistently 
rejecting my messages is a 
serious issue for me.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-10 Threatening someone by 
sending fearful messages, 
pictures and videos is a 
serious issue for me. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-11 Sending sexual messages, 
pictures and videos on SNS is 
a serious issue for me. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q29-12 Suggesting, through SNS, 
that someone get into 
prostitution is a serious issue 
for me. 











Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q33-1 I have some stress because I 
don’t have a good relationship 
with my family. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q33-2 I have some stress because I 
don’t have a good relationship 
with my friends. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q33-3 I have some stress because 
someone unfairly treats me.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q33-4 I have some stress because my 
financial status is poor. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q33-5 I have some stress because of 
school grades  
(Question only for middle and 
high school students). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q33-6 I have some stress because of my 
appearance  
(Question only for middle and 
high school students). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 







Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q34-1 I usually feel blue.  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-2 I frequently think my life is 
unfortunate and gloomy. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-3 I have much worry. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-4 Sometimes I feel like I want 
to commit suicide.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-5 I cry often.  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-6 When something wrong 
happens, I feel as if it is my 
fault. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-7 I feel lonely.  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-8 I don’t have any interest in 
the rest of my life.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-9 I don’t feel that my future is 
hopeful.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q34-10 I feel very bad about 
everything. 




 Part I: Experience of Online 
 







Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q35-1 I have used someone else’s social 
security number (including a family 
member), without their permission, 
online.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q35-2 I have illegally downloaded 
subscription-based software online. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q35-3 I have watched or downloaded porn 
videos/movies online.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q35-4 I have slandered someone online. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Q36. How often do you recognize that online users slander and use swearwords each 
other? 
 (1) None (2) Sometimes  (3) Often (4) Very often 
 
Q37. How frequently do you think that personal information is leaked from online web 
sites, other than on social networking sites? 
 (1) None (2) Sometimes  (3) Often (4) Very often 
 
 
 Part J: Policy Implication 
 







Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Q38-1 Law enforcement agents can use the 
function of location chase on SNS to 
prevent crime.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q38-2 Law enforcement agents can use 
personal history on SNS to prevent 
crime. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q38-3 Freedom of expression online can be 
prohibited on SNS to prevent crime. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Q39. How strong of an ethical level do you think that our society has on SNS? 
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 (1) Very low-level (2) Low level (3) Strong level (4) Very strong level 
 
Q40. In your opinion, which suggestion is the best way to enforce the ethical level on 
 SNS? 
 (1) Do not do anything, then the level of ethic will be enforced itself. 
 (2) Under the criminal justice system, law enforcement authorities must      
punish the criminals.  
 (3) Online users enforce the ethics on SNS themselves. 
 (4) The SNS provider needs to have some campaign or to                   
     impose sanctions on criminals. 
 (5) Others (                                 ) 
 
 
 Part K: Other 
 
DQ1. What kinds of transportation do you use? 
(1) Walk (2) Train (3) Bus (4) Taxi  (5) Car  (6) 
Bicycle 
 
DQ2. Where do you mostly spend your time during the week? 
(1) Home (2) School (3) Library  (4) Office (5) Others 
 
DQ3. Where do you mostly spend your time during the weekend? 
(1) Home (2) Gym (3) Library  (4) Multiplex mall for entertainment
 (5) Bar  (6) Others 
 
DQ4.  What is your profession? 
(1) Manager/specialist (2) Office worker (3) Sales person  
(4) Agricultural and fisher expert  (5) Basic level worker  (6) Basic level 
Office worker  (7) Military officer (8) Housewife  (9) Student 
 (10) Other 
 
DQ5.  What is your highest level of education? 
(1) Elementary school  (2) Middle school  (3) High school  (4) College  (5) University  
(6) Graduate school  (7) None 
 
DQ6. What is your average monthly income? 
(1) 0 ~ $1000 (2) $1000 ~ $2000 (3) $2000 ~ $3000 (4) $3000 ~ $4000 
(5) $4000 ~ $5000 (6) $5000 ~ $6000 (7) $6000 ~ $7000 (8) Over $7000  
  
DQ7. How many family members reside in your home? Write down the number of 
family members. 






Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Statistics 
 Age Gender 
N Valid 1000 1000 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 32.75 .5100 
Std. Error of Mean .363 .01582 
Median 31.89a .5100a 
Mode 20 1.00 
Std. Deviation 11.474 .50015 
Variance 131.650 .250 
Skewness .265 -.040 
Std. Error of Skewness .077 .077 
Kurtosis -.947 -2.002 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .155 .155 
Range 45 1.00 
Minimum 14 .00 
Maximum 59 1.00 
Sum 32753 510.00 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Female 490 49.0 49.0 49.0 
Male 510 51.0 51.0 100.0 









Appendix III: Independent Measures 
 




N Valid 1000 
Missing 0 
Mean 2.3500 
Std. Error of Mean .03732 
Median 2.0000 
Mode 2.00 
Std. Deviation 1.18021 
Variance 1.393 
Skewness -.224 
Std. Error of Skewness .077 
Kurtosis -.346 








 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid .00 91 9.1 9.1 9.1 
1.00 102 10.2 10.2 19.3 
2.00 366 36.6 36.6 55.9 
3.00 261 26.1 26.1 82.0 
4.00 168 16.8 16.8 98.8 
5.00 11 1.1 1.1 99.9 
6.00 1 .1 .1 100.0 






Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
dimension0  
1 1.311 65.550 65.550 1.311 65.550 65.550 
2 .689 34.450 100.000    










8_1_Digital Guardianship (SNS 
Security) 
.810 
8_2_Application to make new 
friendships 
.810 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 












Based on Standardized 
Items N of Items 





Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 






Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
35_2_Downloading illegally software 
online 
2.66 1.053 .565 .336 .734 
35_3_Watching or Downloading porn 
videos/movies 
2.78 1.031 .680 .467 .590 
35_4_Slandering someone online 2.97 1.298 .571 .358 .723 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter 
B Std. Error 
95% Wald Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test 
Exp(B) 
95% Wald Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) -.070 .0890 -.245 .104 .619 1 .431 .932 .783 1.110 
[New_Gender=.00] .182 .1238 -.061 .424 2.157 1 .142 1.199 .941 1.529 
[New_Gender=1.00] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Digital_Guardian .062 .0195 .023 .100 9.981 1 .002 1.064 1.024 1.105 
[New_Gender=.00] * 
Digital_Guardian 
-.058 .0275 -.112 -.004 4.486 1 .034 .943 .894 .996 
[New_Gender=1.00] * 
Digital_Guardian 
0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
(Scale) .262b .0117 .240 .286       
Dependent Variable: Cyber_H_S=New_Q12_8 + New_Q12_9 + New_12_10 + New_Q12_11 
Model: (Intercept), New_Gender, Digital_Guardian, New_Gender * Digital_Guardian 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 




Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
dimension0  
1 2.059 68.642 68.642 2.059 68.642 68.642 
2 .571 19.032 87.673    
3 .370 12.327 100.000    








35_2_Downloading illegally software 
online 
.798 
35_3_Watching or Downloading porn 
videos/movies 
.876 
35_4_Slandering someone online .809 







35_2_Downloading illegally software 
online 
.798 
35_3_Watching or Downloading porn 
videos/movies 
.876 
35_4_Slandering someone online .809 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
 




N Valid 1000 
Missing 0 
Mean 1.2050 
Std. Error of Mean .04766 
Median .8143a 
Mode .00 
Std. Deviation 1.50707 
Variance 2.271 
Skewness 1.511 
Std. Error of Skewness .077 
Kurtosis 2.842 






































B Std. Error 
95% Wald Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test 
Exp(B) 
95% Wald Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) -2.331 .3161 -2.950 -1.711 54.375 1 .000 .097 .052 .181 
[New_Gender=.00] -.899 .5147 -1.908 .110 3.051 1 .081 .407 .148 1.116 
[New_Gender=1.00] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Risky_Online_Behavior .153 .0603 .035 .271 6.429 1 .011 1.165 1.035 1.312 
[New_Gender=.00] * 
Risky_Online_Behavior 
.131 .1079 -.080 .343 1.478 1 .224 1.140 .923 1.409 
[New_Gender=1.00] * 
Risky_Online_Behavior 
0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
(Scale) 1b          
(Negative binomial) 1          
Dependent Variable: Cyber_H_S=New_Q12_8 + New_Q12_9 + New_12_10 + New_Q12_11 
Model: (Intercept), New_Gender, Risky_Online_Behavior, New_Gender * Risky_Online_Behavior 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b. Fixed at the displayed value. 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 539 53.9 53.9 53.9 
1 2 .2 .2 54.1 
4 1 .1 .1 54.2 
5 7 .7 .7 54.9 
10 30 3.0 3.0 57.9 
15 5 .5 .5 58.4 
19 1 .1 .1 58.5 
20 21 2.1 2.1 60.6 
25 4 .4 .4 61.0 
30 32 3.2 3.2 64.2 
35 1 .1 .1 64.3 
40 28 2.8 2.8 67.1 
45 4 .4 .4 67.5 
50 26 2.6 2.6 70.1 
55 4 .4 .4 70.5 
60 43 4.3 4.3 74.8 
65 1 .1 .1 74.9 
70 44 4.4 4.4 79.3 
75 2 .2 .2 79.5 
80 42 4.2 4.2 83.7 
90 24 2.4 2.4 86.1 
95 6 .6 .6 86.7 
99 1 .1 .1 86.8 
100 132 13.2 13.2 100.0 









 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 190 19.0 19.0 19.0 
1 1 .1 .1 19.1 
5 6 .6 .6 19.7 
9 2 .2 .2 19.9 
10 30 3.0 3.0 22.9 
15 6 .6 .6 23.5 
20 40 4.0 4.0 27.5 
25 7 .7 .7 28.2 
30 43 4.3 4.3 32.5 
35 4 .4 .4 32.9 
40 33 3.3 3.3 36.2 
45 4 .4 .4 36.6 
50 28 2.8 2.8 39.4 
55 4 .4 .4 39.8 
60 31 3.1 3.1 42.9 
70 47 4.7 4.7 47.6 
80 40 4.0 4.0 51.6 
85 2 .2 .2 51.8 
90 31 3.1 3.1 54.9 
95 2 .2 .2 55.1 
98 1 .1 .1 55.2 
99 3 .3 .3 55.5 
100 445 44.5 44.5 100.0 






















B Std. Error 
95% Wald Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test 
Exp(B) 
95% Wald Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) -.604 .4300 -1.446 .239 1.971 1 .160 .547 .235 1.270 
[New_Gender=.00] -1.689 .8306 -3.316 -.061 4.133 1 .042 .185 .036 .941 
[New_Gender=1.00] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Q1_43 -.013 .0048 -.022 -.004 7.314 1 .007 .987 .978 .996 
Q1_41 -.008 .0049 -.018 .001 2.852 1 .091 .992 .982 1.001 
[New_Gender=.00] * Q1_43 .014 .0090 -.004 .031 2.339 1 .126 1.014 .996 1.032 
[New_Gender=1.00] * Q1_43 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
[New_Gender=.00] * Q1_41 .015 .0094 -.004 .033 2.479 1 .115 1.015 .996 1.034 
[New_Gender=1.00] * Q1_41 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
(Scale) 1b          
(Negative binomial) 1          
Dependent Variable: Cyber_H_S=New_Q12_8 + New_Q12_9 + New_12_10 + New_Q12_11 
Model: (Intercept), New_Gender, Q1_43, Q1_41, New_Gender * Q1_43, New_Gender * Q1_41 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b. Fixed at the displayed value. 
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General Info: New_Q7A1 + New_Q7A2 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
dimension0  
1 1.755 87.739 87.739 1.755 87.739 87.739 
2 .245 12.261 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Age & Photo: New_Q7C12 + New_Q7C13 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
dimension0  
1 1.315 65.743 65.743 1.315 65.743 65.743 
2 .685 34.257 100.000    




B Std. Error 
95% Wald Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test 
Exp(B) 
95% Wald Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1.085 .4536 .196 1.974 5.717 1 .017 2.958 1.216 7.197 
[New_Gender=.00] -2.078 .7830 -3.613 -.543 7.043 1 .008 .125 .027 .581 
[New_Gender=1.00] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Q5_01 -.033 .0056 -.044 -.022 34.135 1 .000 .968 .957 .979 
[New_Gender=.00] * Q5_01 .020 .0092 .002 .038 4.884 1 .027 1.021 1.002 1.039 
[New_Gender=1.00] * Q5_01 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
(Scale) 1b          
(Negative binomial) 1          
Dependent Variable: Cyber_H_S=New_Q12_8 + New_Q12_9 + New_12_10 + New_Q12_11 
Model: (Intercept), New_Gender, Q5_01, New_Gender * Q5_01 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b. Fixed at the displayed value. 
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Occupation: New_Q7A4 + New_A7A5 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
dimension0  
1 1.606 80.302 80.302 1.606 80.302 80.302 
2 .394 19.698 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Private Info: New_Q7A6 + New_Q7A7+ New_Q7A13 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
dimension0  
1 1.693 56.440 56.440 1.693 56.440 56.440 
2 .716 23.875 80.315    
3 .591 19.685 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Personal Contact-Facebook: New_Q7A8 + New_Q7A9 + New_Q7A10 + 
New_Q7A11 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
dimension0  
1 2.097 52.424 52.424 2.097 52.424 52.424 
2 .733 18.319 70.742    
3 .667 16.675 87.417    
4 .503 12.583 100.000    












7_A8 Facebook .732 
7_A9 Facebook .756 
7_A10 Facebook .713 
















Cyber_H_S=New_Q12_8 + New_Q12_9 + New_12_10 + New_Q12_11 
N Valid 1000 
Missing 0 
Mean .1650 
Std. Error of Mean .01631 
Median .1211a 
Mode .00 
Std. Deviation .51579 
Variance .266 
Skewness 3.808 
Std. Error of Skewness .077 
Kurtosis 16.469 





a. Calculated from grouped data. 
 
 
Cyber_H_S=New_Q12_8 + New_Q12_9 + New_12_10 + New_Q12_11 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid .00 883 88.3 88.3 88.3 
1.00 83 8.3 8.3 96.6 
2.00 22 2.2 2.2 98.8 
3.00 10 1.0 1.0 99.8 
4.00 2 .2 .2 100.0 






































B Std. Error 
95% Wald Confidence Interval Hypothesis Test 
Exp(B) 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-Square df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) -3.601 .4976 -4.576 -2.625 52.356 1 .000 .027 .010 .072 
[New_Gender=.00] 1.496 .7082 .108 2.884 4.462 1 .035 4.464 1.114 17.889 
[New_Gender=1.00] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Lack_Ditigal_G .238 .0994 .043 .433 5.717 1 .017 1.268 1.044 1.541 
Risky_Online_B .182 .0530 .078 .286 11.816 1 .001 1.200 1.081 1.331 
Unknown_Friends .032 .0057 .020 .043 30.433 1 .000 1.032 1.021 1.044 
[New_Gender=.00] * 
Lack_Ditigal_G 
-.309 .1528 -.608 -.009 4.077 1 .043 .734 .544 .991 
[New_Gender=1.00] * 
Lack_Ditigal_G 
0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
[New_Gender=.00] * 
Unknown_Friends 
-.020 .0096 -.039 -.001 4.293 1 .038 .980 .962 .999 
[New_Gender=1.00] * 
Unknown_Friends 
0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
(Scale) 1b          
(Negative binomial) 1          
Dependent Variable: Cyber_H_S=New_Q12_8 + New_Q12_9 + New_12_10 + New_Q12_11 
Model: (Intercept), New_Gender, Lack_Ditigal_G, Risky_Online_B, Unknown_Friends, New_Gender * 
Lack_Ditigal_G, New_Gender * Unknown_Friends 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 













Correlations and Covariances between Variables 















Guardianship .082 -   











.000 .000 -  









Unknown Friends .366 .000 .151 - 
.246 3.713 1.178 295.9 
      
    
    
The top value in each cell is the correlation coefficient.  The value below it is 
the variances or covariances 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 













Appendix V: Formal/Informal Capable Guardianship 
 
Formal Capable Guardianship 
 
14_Reporting to Police 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid I have never reported it 180 18.0 97.3 97.3 
I have reported it 5 .5 2.7 100.0 
Total 185 18.5 100.0  
Missing System 815 81.5   
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
14_1_Reason for Not Reporting to Police 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid I did not feel like taking the time to 
report it to the police 
28 2.8 15.6 15.6 
I thought the evidence of the crime was 
not enough to catch the offender 
14 1.4 7.8 23.3 
I thought it was not an issue to report to 
the police 
3 .3 1.7 25.0 
My victimization was not serious 135 13.5 75.0 100.0 
Total 180 18.0 100.0  
Missing System 820 82.0   
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
14_2_Satisfaction with Solution of Police 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid I was satisfied with the service of the 
police, but the offender was not captured 
3 .3 60.0 60.0 
I was not satisfied with the service of the 
police and the offender was not captured 
2 .2 40.0 100.0 
Total 5 .5 100.0  
Missing System 995 99.5   





Informal Capable Guardianship 
 
15_Reporting to SNS Provider 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid I did not 173 17.3 93.5 93.5 
I did 12 1.2 6.5 100.0 
Total 185 18.5 100.0  
Missing System 815 81.5   
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
15_1_ Reason for Not Reporting to SNS Provider 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid My victimization was not serious 105 10.5 60.7 60.7 
I did not feel like taking the time to 
report it to the provider 
48 4.8 27.7 88.4 
I thought it was not an issue to report to 
the company 
3 .3 1.7 90.2 
I thought even if I report it, it might not 
be changed 
17 1.7 9.8 100.0 
Total 173 17.3 100.0  
Missing System 827 82.7   
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
15_2_Satisfaction with Solution of SNS Provider 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly not satisfied 2 .2 16.7 16.7 
Not satisfied 6 .6 50.0 66.7 
Satisfied 3 .3 25.0 91.7 
Strongly satisfied 1 .1 8.3 100.0 
Total 12 1.2 100.0  
Missing System 988 98.8   
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
